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Preferential Transfers, the Floating Lien, and
Section 547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978
Richard F. Duncan *
I. INTRODUCTION

The major substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 19781 have been in effect for more than two
years, 2 and flesh is beginning to form on the statutory skeleton. However, the New Act is still in its infancy, and many
of its murky regions have yet to be charted by the courts and
commentators. One such as yet indistinct area is section
547(c)(5),3 which creates a safe harbor for certain perfected
security interests in commercial collateral that would otherwise fall prey to the trustee's power to avoid preferential
transfers. The primary purpose of this article is to assay the
policy, substance and logic of section 547(c)(5), and to underscore the symbiotic relationship between that section and
section 547(b) of the New Act.4
In order to take into account changing commercial
practices and the widespread adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Bankruptcy Reform Act substantially reformed the substantive law of preferential transfers. 5
Associate Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of Law.
1. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified primarily at I I U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1980) and scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1980)) [hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy Reform Act or the New Act].
2. For the most part, the substantive provisions of the Bankruptcy Reform Act
became effective on October 1, 1979. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-598, § 402, 92 Stat. 2682 (1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. note prec. § 101 (Supp. IV
1980)). The bankruptcy law replaced by the Bankruptcy Reform Act was the frequently amended Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Bankruptcy Act of 1898, Ch. 541, 30 Stat.
544 (repealed 1978) (codified at 11 U.S.C. (1976)) [hereinafter cited as the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 or the Former Act].
3. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980). Section 547(b) establishes the power of
the trustee in bankruptcy to avoid preferential transfers of property of the debtor.
Section 547(c)(5) creates an exception to that power in the case of certain transfers of
perfected security interests in inventory, receivables or the proceeds thereof.
5. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 372 (1977), reprinted in [1978] U.S.
*
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Section 547(b) of the New Act provides that the trustee may
avoid as preferential any transfer 6 of property of the debtor:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed
by the debtor before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made(A) on or within 90 days before the date of
the filing of the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the
date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor, at
the time of such transfer(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the
debtor was insolvent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than
such creditor would receive if(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of
this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such
debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this
title.7
The first element, that the transfer be made to or for the benefit of a creditor, should normally be subject to mechanical
application.8 In the typical case, the trustee should be able
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6328 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. For a

general discussion of the changes brought about by § 547 of the New Act, see Kaye,
Preferences Underthe New Bankruptcy Code, 54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 197 (1980); Macey,
Preferences And Fraudulent Transfers Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 28
EMORY L.J. 685 (1979); Young, Preferences Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
54 AM. BANKR. L.J. 221 (1980).

6. The term "transfer" is broadly defined in § 101 of the New Act to include
any voluntary or involuntary disposition of property or an interest in property. 11
U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. IV 1980). Thus, both absolute conveyances of, and creation
of security interests in, the debtor's property may result in a preferential transfer
under § 547(b). See In re Gruber Bottling Works, Inc., 16 Bankr. 348, 351 (Bankr.

E.D. Pa. 1982).
7. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980).
8. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND
MATERIALS 467 (2d ed. 1982). For example, a gratuitous transfer is not a preference
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to satisfy the third requirement simply by resort to section
547(o, which creates a rebuttable presumption that the

debtor was insolvent "on and during the 90 days immediately preceding the date of the filing of the petition."9 Moreover, since a creditor is almost always better off with than
without a prepetition transfer, the fifth element should be
met in all cases except those where the preferred creditor
was fully secured before the transfer or the chapter 7 distribution is 100 per cent to all general, unsecured claims.' 0
The second and fourth elements both involve the chronology of the allegedly preferential transfer, and, although
they should be easy to establish in most cases, they are of
critical importance when applied to a floating lien" under
because it is not to or for the benefit of a creditor. Butz v. Wheeler, 17 Bankr. 85
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981).
9. I!U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. IV 1980). Under FED. R. EVID. 301 the effect of
this presumption is to shift to the preferred creditor the burden of going forward with
evidence to rebut the presumption. The ultimate burden of persuasion on the issue of
the debtor's insolvency remains with the trustee. In re Belize Airways Ltd., 18 Bankr.
485 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982); In re Lucasa Int'l, Ltd., 14 Bankr. 980, 982 (Bankr. S.D.
N.Y. 1981); In re National Buy-Rite Inc., 7 Bankr. 407, 409 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980);
In re Butler, 3 Bankr. 182, 185 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980); HOUSE REPORT, supra note
5, at 178-79. See Macey, supra note 5, at 688-89. For a case in which the transferee
successfully rebutted the presumption by introducing somewhat meager documentary
evidence of solvency, see In re Thomas Farm Systems, Inc., 18 Bankr. 541 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1982).
10. See EPSTEIN & LANDERS, supra note 8, at 468; R. HENSON, HANDBOOK ON
SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE

12 (2d ed. 1979

Supp.); Henson, The Uniform Commerical Code and the New Bankruptcy Act. Some
Problem Areas, 35 Bus. LAW. 83, 92 (1979). For example, assume that a creditor has
a claim against the debtor of $100,000 and valid-in-bankruptcy collateral of $150,000.
If such creditor receives a $10,000 payment within 90 days of bankruptcy no preference results, because the payment has not enabled him to receive more than he would
have received in chapter 7 had the transfer not been made. With the transfer, the
creditor receives the $10,000 payment and $90,000 in chapter 7 from his collateral;
without the transfer, he would receive $100,000 in chapter 7 from his collateral; in
either case, the creditor is paid in full and the debtor's bankruptcy estate retains the
debtor's equity in the collateral. See Barash v. Public Fin. Corp., 658 F.2d 504 (7th
Cir. 1981); In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Zuni, 6 Bankr.
449 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1980); J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW
UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 24-4, at 1004-05 (2d ed. 1980).
11. The term "floating lien" is a metaphor applied to a security interest which
"floats" or shifts with respect to either or both the property subject to the security
interest and the amount of the obligation secured thereby. See EPSTEIN & LANDERS,
supra note 8, at 181. The typical floating lien covers both present and future extensions of credit made to the debtor, as well as present and future collateral owned by
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attack by the trustee as a preference.
II. AFTER-ACQUIRED COLLATERAL AND
PREFERENCE LAW-THE PROBLEM AND
THE RESPONSE UNDER THE
FORMER ACT

For purposes of bankruptcy preference law, when is a
transfer of a perfected security interest in property made?
Suppose, for example, that on January 1, 1982, SP makes a
loan of $100,000 to D and retains and immediately perfects a
security interest in all D's inventory and proceeds thereof
"whether now owned or hereafter acquired."' 2 At the time
of the loan, the value of D's inventory is $50,000. Two
weeks later, on January 15, 1982, D purchases additional inventory with a value of $20,000. Was the "transfer" of a
perfected security interest in this after-acquired inventory
made on January 1, 1982, when SP perfected its original security interest, or on January 15, 1982, when D acquired the
collateral?
One way to analyze the problem is to look to the perfection and attachment provisions of Article 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code. Under U.C.C. section 9-303, a security
interest is perfected "when it has attached and when all of
the applicable steps required for perfection have been
taken." 13 The concept of attachment is defined in section 9the debtor. Although floating liens are most often created in the context of inventory
and accounts receivable financing, it is not unusual for a security agreement covering
equipment to contain after-acquired collateral and future advance clauses.
12. U.C.C. § 9-204(1) (1972) provides that "a security agreement may provide
that any or all obligations covered by the security agreement are to be secured by
after-acquired collateral." Moreover, § 9-204(3) provides that "[olbligations covered
by a security agreement may include future advances or other value whether or not
the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment." Taken together, these provisions validate the floating lien. See also U.C.C. §§ 9-203(3), 9-205, 9-306(2) (1972).
Throughout this article the UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE shall often be referred
to as the Code or U.C.C. All references in this article to the text and comments of the
Code, unless otherwise indicated, are to the 1972 official text of the Code. For a
discussion of the pre-Code development of the after-acquired property clause, see
Friedman, The Bankruptcy Preference Challenge to After-Acquired Property Clauses
Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194, 197-200 (1959).
13. U.C.C. § 9-303 (1972).
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203 of the Code.' 4 In general, a security interest does not
attach until all of the following have occurred: (i) the debtor
has signed an adequate security agreement (or the collateral
is in the possession of the secured party pursuant to agreement); (ii) the secured party has given "value"; and (iii) the
debtor has rights in the collateral.' 5 The steps required for
perfection are enumerated in sections 9-302, 9-304, 9-305
and 9-306 of the Code. 16 Some security interests, such as
purchase money security interests in consumer goods, are
perfected automatically at the time of attachment without
any additional requirements. 17 However, a secured party
generally perfects an Article 9 security interest either by
filing a financing statement in the proper public8 office or offices or by taking possession of the collateral.'
In the hypothetical posed above, it could be argued that
under the U.C.C. a perfected security interest in the January
15 inventory was not transferred to SP until January 15,
1982, when D acquired rights in the collateral and the security interest simultaneously attached and became perfected,' 9
and that, therefore, it is a transfer made for or on account of
an antecedent debt (the January 1 loan) for purposes of
bankruptcy preference analysis. However, this argument
was rejected by an overwhelming majority of cases 20 decided
under section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.21 These
cases adopted a number of colorfully named theories to explain denial of the trustee's preference claim. Two of these
14. Id at § 9-203.
15. Id. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, §§ 23-1 to 23-4, at 90117; Sanford, Debtor'sRights In CollateralAs a RequirementforAttachment of a Security Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 26 S.D. L. REV. 163 (1981).

16. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-304 to 9-306 (1972).
17. E.g., id at § 9-302(i)(d).
18. Id at §§ 9-302, 9-304 to 9-305. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS, Supra note
10, §§ 23-5 to 23-16, at 918-64.

19.

See

B. CLARK, THE LAW OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNI-

COMMERCIAL CODE $ 6.6[1], at 6-39 (1980); Harrington, Insecurity ForSecured
Creditors-The FloatingLien And Section 547 of the Bankruptcy Act, 63 MARQ. L.
REV. 447, 459-60 (1980).
20. See B. CLARK, supra note 19, T 6.6[1], at 6-40 to 6-41.
FORM

21. 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1976) (repealed 1978) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 60,
30 Stat. 562, as amended by, Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869 (1938)).
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justifications, the so-called "Mississippi River" 22 and "so far
perfected" 23 theories, in essence operated to relate the transfer of a perfected security interest in after-acquired collateral
back to the time of the perfection of the original security
interest.
The "Mississippi River" theory conceived of the collateral in a collective sense-the security interest was viewed as
attaching to the entity or floating mass of present and future
collateral at the time of the initial perfection, rather than to
individual units or atoms of collateral as they were acquired
by the debtor. Proponents of this theory argued that there
was but a single transfer of the present and future mass of
collateral to the secured party, that this transfer occurred at
the time of the perfection of the original security interest,
and that, therefore, it was made for present value and not on
account of an antecedent debt.2 4 The problem with this argument is that it defies clearly expressed language in section
9-203(l)(c) of the Code providing that a security interest
does not attach until the debtor has rights in the collateral.25
It has also been criticized by commentators as potentially
22. This theory is also known as the "entity," "floating mass" or "res" theory.
See B. CLARK, supra note 19, 6.6[1], at 6-39; Countryman, Code Security Interests in
Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269, 277 (1970).
23. Professor Countryman, a critic of the theory, referred to it as "The Abracadabra, or the Transfer Occurred before It Occurred Theory." Countryman, supra
note 22, at 277.
24. Kronman, The Treatment of Security Interests In After Acquired Property
Under The ProposedBankruptcy Act, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 110, 126 (1975). See B.
6.6[1], at 6-39; Countryman, supra note 22, at 277; HarringCLARK, supra note 19,
ton, supra note 19, at 463; Macey, supra note 5, at 697-98. In Rosenberg v. Rudnick,
262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967), District Judge Ford explained the theory in these
words:
.. . inventory subjected to a security interest should be viewed as a single
entity and not as a mere conglomeration of individual items each subject to
a separate lien. . . . The security interest is in the entity as a whole, not in
its individual components, and the transfer of property occurs when this interest in the inventory as an entity is created.
Id at 639. See also Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings
Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsubnom., France v. Union Bank and Savings
Co., 369 U.S. 827 (1969); In re Portland Newspaper Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395
(D. Ore. 1967), q/'d sub nom. on other grounds, DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277
(9th Cir. 1969).
25. U.C.C. § 9-203(1)(c) (1972). See B. CLARK, supra note 19, 6.6[l], at 6-39.
See also U.C.C. § 9-204(1) & (2) (1962).

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

1982]

shielding intentional preferences, in the form of deliberate
buildups of collateral on the eve of bankruptcy, from the

trustee's avoiding powers.26

The "so far perfected" theory was based on language in
section 60(a)(2) of the Former Act which provided that for
purposes of determining when a purportedly preferential
transfer had been made:
a transfer of property other than real property shall be
deemed to have been made or suffered at the time when
it became so far perfected that no subsequent lien upon
such property obtainable by legal or equitable proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the
rights of the transferee.27

Thus, since an Article 9 security interest is subordinate to the
rights of a lien creditor only when the lien is acquired
"before the security interest is perfected,

' 28

a security interest

attaching to after-acquired collateral is shielded against lien
creditors from the moment a financing statement is filed to
perfect the original security interest.29
26. See Harrington,supra note 19, at 464; Hogan, Games Lawyers Play With The
Bankruptcy Preference Challenge To Accounts And Inventory Financing, 53 CORNELL
L. REV. 553, 561 (1968). Professor Hogan was concerned that the debtor might liquidate other assets at crash or distress sales in order to feed the favored creditor's afteracquired collateral clause. Id See also WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 1008.
27. 11 U.S.C. § 96(a)(2) (1976) (repealed 1978) (Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541,
§ 60(a)(2), 30 Stat. 562, as amended by, Chandler Act, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 869
(1938)).
28. U.C.C. § 9-301(1)(b) (1972) (emphasis added). See id at § 9-201.
29. Since the security interest in after-acquired collateral would be perfected,
under the earlier filing, at the moment the security interest attached (i.e. upon the
debtor's acquiring rights in the collateral), the best a lien creditor of the debtor could
achieve would be a draw. U.C.C. §§ 9-302, 9-303(1) (1972). See Hogan, supra note
26, at 557. It appears that the U.C.C. would grant priority to the security interest in
the unlikely event of such a dead heat. U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(l)(b) (1972). See G.
GILMORE,

2

SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY §

35.6, at 936-37 (1965);

Young, supra note 5, at 232. Therefore, the trustee would be unable to show, as required by § 60(a)(2) of the Former Act, that a creditor on a simple contract could
have acquired a "superior" lien on the after-acquired collateral at any time subsequent to the original filing. Under this view of § 60(a)(2), the hypothetical transfer of
the January 15, 1982, inventory posed above would be deemed to have been made in
exchange for present value on January 1, 1982, when the loan was made and the
original security interest was created and perfected. See DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d
1277 (9th Cir. 1969); Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank And Savings
Co., 408 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom., France v. Union Bank and Savings

8
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A third theory, sometimes called the "relaxed substitution" theory,3 ° took the position that it was not a preference
under the Former Act for a secured creditor to receive new
collateral pursuant to an after-acquired property clause, at
least to the extent that, from time to time during the preference period, existing collateral had been sold free of the se-

curity interest by the debtor. 31 This theory did not relate the
transfer of after-acquired collateral back to the time of the

original security interest; instead, it posited a purely fictional

scenario 32 under which newly acquired collateral was

deemed to be taken in exchange for the secured party's release of any pre-existing collateral sold by the debtor free of

the security interest during the preference period. 33 Under

Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967);
WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 24-5, at 878-79 (1972); Harrington, supra note
19, at 466-68; Kronman, supra note 24, at 127-28.
30. A true substitution of collateral should not result in a preference, because
there is no depletion of the debtor's estate and two of the essential elements of a
preferential transfer are not present. See II U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) & (5) (Supp. IV 1980);
4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY $ 547.22 (15th ed. 1979); Countryman, supra note 22, at
273, 277-78. A true substitution of collateral occurs when the transfer of the new
collateral occurs prior to, or contemporaneously with, the release of existing collateral
or equal of greater value. See id. Under the relaxed substitution theory, the time and
value requirements are relaxed or completely overlooked. See infra note 32.
31. See B. CLARK, supra note 19, 6.6[l], at 6-40.
32. For example, in Grain Merchants of Indiana, Inc. v. Union Bank and Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 217 (7th Cir.), cert. deniedsub nom., France v. Union Bank
and Savings Co., 396 U.S. 827 (1969), although the court relied in part on evidence of
actual substitutions of new accounts in exchange for the release of previously collected accounts, it did not require "strict timing or value rules so long as at all relevant times the total pool of collateral. . . exceeded the total debt." Id at 217. Under
this view, it was irrelevant that the new collateral was not transferred prior to or
contemporaneously with the release of the old collateral, and that the new collateral
was of greater value than the released collateral. Id at 217 n. 10. Because of the
requirement in Grain Merchants that there be a surplus of collateral over debt at all
relevant times, the facts of the case would probably produce the same result under the
"improvement in position" test enacted by § 547(c)(5) of the Bankruptcy Reform Act.
See infra notes 96 and 97 and accompanying text. See also In re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 401 (D. Ore. 1967), aff'dsub nom. on other grounds,
DuBay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277 (9th Cir. 1969).
33. Under this theory:
[a] security interest in newly acquired assets is considered to be taken in
exchange for the secured party's release of his rights in existing assets. In
other words . . . the secured party's interest in the new . . . assets is substituted for the interest in the released assets.
Harrington, supra note 19, at 465. See Macey, supra note 5, at 698. Professor Coun-

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

1982]

this reasoning, it therefore followed that there had been no
depletion of the debtor's estate for the benefit of a favored
creditor, and that the after-acquired collateral had been

transferred for new value (i.e. the released collateral) and
not on account of an antecedent indebtedness.34
The final major theory insulating perfected security interests in after-acquired collateral against the trustee's preference attack under the Former Act was U.C.C. section 9-

108, which provides that a
security interest in... after-acquired collateral shall be
deemed to be taken for new value and not as security for
an antecedent debt if the debtor acquires his rights in
such collateral. . . in the ordinary course of his business
35

U.C.C. section 9-108 is a Pickwickian attempt to define away
the preference problem simply by declaring that security interests in after-acquired collateral are not given for antecedent debt. 6 Although a few courts appear to have accepted
this theory,3 7 its validity under the supremacy clause of the

United States Constitution 38 is suspect, because it attempts

to resolve a federal bankruptcy question, i.e. whether or not
a certain class of transfer under preference attack is for or on

account of an antecedent debt, as a matter of state law.39

tryman was, quite convincingly, critical of the relaxed substitution theory. See Countryman, supra note 22, at 277-79.
34. See Harrington, supra note 19, at 464-65.
35. U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972). In order for the section to apply, the secured party is
required to have given new value at the inception of the transaction. Id, Comment 1.
See generally Harrington, supra note 19, at 468-69. For a thoughtful statement of the
case for adoption of § 9-108 in bankruptcy, see Hogan, supra note 26, at 565-74.
36. See Harrington, supra note 19, at 479 n. 128; Note, After-Acquired Property
Security Interestsin Bankruptcy. 4 Substitution of CollateralDefense of the U.C.C, 77
YALE L.J. 139, 142-43 (1967).
37. See, e.g., Owen v. McKesson And Robbins Drug Co., 349 F. Supp. 1327
(N.D. Fla. 1972), afdmem., 486 F.2d 1401 (5th Cir. 1973);1n re Portland Newspaper
Publishing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395 (D. Ore. 1967); Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. Supp.
635 (D. Mass. 1967).
38. "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be the
... U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
supreme Law of the Land.
39. See McKenzie v. Irving Trust Co., 323 U.S. 365, 369-70 (1944); B. CLARK,
supra note 19, 6.6[1], at 6-40; Countryman, The Use of State Law in Bankruptcy
Cases (Part11), 47 N.Y.U. L. REV. 631, 635 (1972); Harrington, supra note 19, at 462;
King, Section 9-108 of the Uniform Commercial Code.- Does It Insulate the Security
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AFTER-ACQUIRED COLLATERAL UNDER
SECTION 547 OF THE BANKRUPTCY
REFORM ACT

Competing state and federal policies clash deafeningly
when a security interest in after-acquired collateral collides
with the power of the trustee to avoid preferential transfers
for the benefit of a bankruptcy estate. Supporting the security interest in after-acquired property are recognition of the
commercial importance of floating lien financing and the
reasonable expectations of secured lenders who extend credit
in reliance on the validity and effectiveness of their afteracquired property clauses. 40 This is especially important in
the case of inventory and accounts financing, because these
kinds of collateral routinely turn over in the ordinary course
of the debtor's business, and the secured party therefore
must look to the after-acquired property clause to maintain
the secured status of its loan at an adequate level. 4 ' When
Interest From Attack by a Trustee In Bankruptcy?, 114 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1124-29
(1966); Kronman, supra note 24, at 124-25. Indeed, some critics of § 9-108 have referred to it as "a clumsy attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the Bankruptcy Act." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted

in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 207. See also G. GILMORE, supra note 29, § 45.6,
at 1309.
40. Article 9 of the Code expressly rejected the "widespread nineteenth century
prejudice against the floating charge." U.C.C. § 9-204, Comment 2 (1972). This former prejudice was based on the view that commercial borrowers should not be permitted to encumber all of their present and future assets for the benefit of one favored
creditor. Id However, as the process of industrialization continued, the credit requirements of business interests led to a search for new sources of collateral and,
concomitantly, novel devices to validate the floating lien. Thus, even under pre-Code
law it was possible to create a valid, enforceable lien on all of the debtor's present and
future property. However, these pre-Code security devices were expensive, inefficient
and needlessly multiplicative. In recognition of this pre-existing state of affairs, Article 9 expressly validated the floating lien and created a single device, the security
interest, to regulate all consensual encumbrances in personal property and fixtures.
See id; I G. GILMORE, supra note 29, § 11.7; Kronman, supra note 24, at 117-19.
41. Current assets are by nature transient: the ongoing life of a business
enterprise requires their continuous liquidation. A business holds inventory
in order to sell it. In the ordinary course of business, inventory is sold and
transformed into accounts receivable (or intangibles of some other sort); accounts receivable are paid and the proceeds used in the purchase of fresh
inventory; and the entire cycle is begun again. Stagnation at any point is
usually a symptom or a cause of commercial failure.
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lenders secure their loans, one of their major concerns is survival of their security in the event of the debtor's insolvency.
Bankruptcy is therefore the litmus test of security; if the after-acquired collateral clause is not protected in bankruptcy,
lenders either will be denied access to an important source of
security against the risk of commercial credit, or will be
forced to resort to needlessly onerous, inefficient policing devices to protect their collateral. 42 In either case, credit is
likely to become both more expensive and less freely
available.
On the other hand, seminal bankruptcy policies seeking
to discourage favoritism and foster equitable distribution of
the assets of bankrupt debtors are also at stake. 43 The interests and reasonable expectations of unsecured creditors are
the foundation of preference policy. Without preference law
in bankruptcy, secured creditors and others receiving transfers of property of the debtor shortly before bankruptcy
could obtain an unfair advantage over other claimants who
also deserve protection. Preference law permits the trustee
to recover certain prepetition transfers from favored creditors thereby maximizing the value of the bankruptcy estate
for the benefit of all creditors. 4 However, as discussed in the
A loan secured by volatile collateral of this type must not impede the
normal metamorphosis of assets from inventory to receivables to cash to
inventory. The debtor must be free to liquidate the collateral securing the
debt as his business requires; in order to keep the debt fully secured, however, fresh collateral of the same sort as the old collateral must take the
latter's place as it is liquidated. This requires a revolving collateral scheme,
which depends upon the recognition and protection of security interests in
after-acquired property. A principal aim of the Article 9 floating lien is to
provide a legal foundation for current assets financing, that is, for financing
on the basis of inventory and receivables.
Kronman, supra note 24, at 119-20 (footnotes omitted). See also Schwartz, Security
Interests andBankruptcy Priorities.A Review ofCurrent Theories, 10 J. LEG. STUDIES

I, 3-4 (1981).
42.

See MacLachlan, The Impact of Bankruptcy on Secured Transactions, 60

COLUM. L. REV. 593, 608 (1960); Kronman, supra note 24, at 128; Note, Avoidance of
PreferentialTransfers Under The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 65 IowA L. REV.
209, 213 (1979). See also supra note 40.
43. See In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267, 269 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981), a 'd, 17

Bankr. 912 (E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Iowa Premium Service Co., Inc., 12 Bankr. 597,
599 (Bankr. S.D. Iowa 1981), afl'd, 676 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1982); HousE REPORT,
supra note 5, at 177-78.
44. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177-78; Kronman, supra note 24, at 142.
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immediately preceding section of this article, the case law
under the Former Act erected an almost impenetrable, protective barrier around perfected security interests attaching
to collateral during the preference period pursuant to afteracquired property clauses in valid pre-existing security
agreements.45 The egalitarian goals underlying federal
bankruptcy preference law were thereby sacrificed at the altar of state policy nurturing the floating lien, and unsecured
creditors, including inventory suppliers dealing with the
debtor on a credit basis, were denied access to what would
otherwise be substantial assets of the debtor's bankruptcy
estate.46
Fundamental bankruptcy policies, although not inviolate, should be compromised only to the extent necessary to
serve other, more important, state or federal purposes. The
case law under the Former Act failed this litmus test. Simply put, these cases went too far-the far-reaching potential
of their holdings was unnecessary from the standpoint of
reasonable commercial expectations, and, consequently, was
unsound as a matter of bankruptcy policy. 47 The CongresTo the extent that the trustee is able to avoid a perfected security interest as a preferential transfer, his recovery will be for the benefit of the debtor's unsecured creditors.
See I1 U.S.C. § 550(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (trustee recovers avoided transfers "for the
benefit of the estate"). An incidental purpose of the law of preferences is to discourage creditors "from racing to... dismember the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 177. However, the deterrent effect of
preference law is limited in two ways. First, creditors without knowledge of the
debtor's insolvency are unlikely to be deterred by preference law from accepting or
seeking prepetition payments or recoveries on account of antecedent debt. Secondly,
even some creditors who have knowledge of the debtor's severe financial straits may
be willing to risk accepting a preference on the not entirely frivolous chance that it
will not be recovered by the trustee. See McCoid, Bankruptcy, Preferences and Efficiency. An Expression of Doubt, 67 VA. L. REV. 249, 264 (1981). The elimination in
most cases by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of the requirement that the trustee prove
that the preferred creditor had reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer being attacked as preferential underscores the dominance of the policy of equality of distribution over that of deterrence under New Act
preference law. See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178. See also infra note 132 and
accompanying text.
45. See supra notes 20 to 39 and accompanying text.
46. See Kronman, supra note 24, at 134; Nimmer, Security Interests In Bankruptcy: An Overview of Section 547ofthe Code, 17 Hous. L. REV. 289, 305-06 (1980).
47. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
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sional response to this situation was, typically, enactment of
a compromise, sections 547(e) 48 and 547(c)(5) 49 of the Bank-

ruptcy Reform Act.
Under section 547(e), most collateral acquired by the
debtor during the preference period is recaptured in the
trustee's preference net;50 section 547(c)(5) then rends a significant, but less than complete, hole in that net, thereby per-

mitting a substantial amount of after-acquired collateral to
escape the trustee. 5 The remainder of this article will attempt to assay the logic and wisdom of this legislative attempt to resolve a difficult problem.
A.

Section 547(e)

The timing of a transfer is critical to three elements of

the trustee's section 547(b) preference attack.2

Section

547(e) of the New Act adopts a clear and exhaustive formu-

lation of when a transfer is made for purposes of bankruptcy
preference analysis. 3

With respect to Article 9 security interests in personal
property, section 547(e) applies a combination of three dis-

tinct, chronological factors to determine the timing of an alCODE (1970), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 217; Nimmer, supra note
46, at 309. See also infra note 154 and accompanying text.
48. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
49. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
50. See infra Section III A.
51. See infra Section III B.
52. The timing of the transfer determines whether it has been made for or on
account of an antecedent debt, while the debtor was insolvent, and within the preference period. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(2)-(4) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 7 to 11 and
accompanying text.
53. Section 547(e) provides:
(e)(1) For the purposes of this section(A) a transfer of real property other than fixtures, but including the
interest of a seller or purchaser under a contract for the sale of real property,
is perfected when a bona fide purchaser of such property from the debtor
against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected cannot
acquire an interest that is superior to the interest of the transferee; and
(B) a transfer of a fixture or property other than real property is perfected when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien
that is superior to the interest of the transferee.
(2) For the purposes of this section, except as provided in paragraph (3)
of this subsection, a transfer is made-(A) at the time such transfer takes effect between the transferor and
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legedly preferential transfer: (1) the time at which such
transfer becomes effective between the debtor and the secured party;5 4 (2) the time at which such transfer is perfected
time at which the
against certain third parties;5 and (3) the
56
debtor acquires rights in the collateral.
Under section 547(e)(2)(A), a transfer of a security interest in personal property will be deemed made, for purposes of bankruptcy preference law, at the time it attaches
under section 9-203 of the U.C.C., provided it is perfected
under the Code not later than ten days after attachment. 7
the transferee, if such transfer is perfected at, or within 10 days after, such
time;
(B) at the time such transfer is perfected, if such transfer is perfected
after such 10 days; or
(C) immediately before the date of the filing of the petition, if such
transfer is not perfected at the later of(i) the commencement of the case; and
(ii) 10 days after such transfer takes effect between the transferor
and the transferee.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a transfer is not made until the
debtor has acquired rights in the property transferred.
I I U.S.C. § 547(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). Under the Code, a security interest becomes effective (i.e. enforceable) between the parties at the time of attachment.
U.C.C. § 9-203(1) & (2) (1972). See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text.
55. A transfer of an interest in personal property is perfected for purposes of
§ 547 "when a creditor on a simple contract cannot acquire a judicial lien that is
superior to the interest of the transferee." Il U.S.C. § 547(e)(l)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
This language, which is similar to the "so far perfected" test of § 60(a)(2) of the Former Act (see supra notes 27-29 and accompanying text), is in all material respects
identical with the concept of perfection against lien creditors under article 9 of the
Code. See U.C.C. §§ 9-201, 9-301(l)(b) (1972). See also supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
56. I1 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). The principal significance of
§ 547(e)(3) is with respect to security interests attaching to after-acquired collateral
during the preference period. See infra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
57. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). Although at first glance this provision appears similar to U.C.C. § 9-301(2), closer inspection reveals significant differences. Thus, the 10-day grace period under the Code is limited to purchase money
security interests, while § 547(e)(2)(A) applies broadly to all transfers. Additionally,
the 10-day period under the Code begins to run when the debtor "receives possession
of the collateral," while under the Bankruptcy Reform Act the grace period starts "at
the time [the] transfer takes effect between the transferor and the transferee." Compare U.C.C. § 9-301(2) (1972), with I1 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). In a
recent article, Professor Hogan criticized this failure of the New Act to conform to the
Code:
If delivery is delayed the bankruptcy 10 days may well expire before the
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In effect, section 547(e)(2)(A) gives the secured party a tenday grace period following attachment to perfect its security
interest. However, if the secured party perfects outside the
grace period, the transfer will be deemed made at the time of
perfection under section 547(e)(2)(B).58 Finally, if the secured party fails to perfect before the later of the expiration
of the grace period and the commencement of the bankruptcy case, the transfer will be deemed to have been made
"immediately before the date of the filing of the petition." 59
The operation of section 547(e) is best explained by illustration. Suppose, for example, that on January 1, 1982,
SP makes a loan to D and obtains an adequate security
agreement creating a security interest in certain items of D's
business equipment. Subsequently, on January 5, 1982, SP
duly files a financing statement to perfect its security interest
in the equipment. Under section 547(e)(2)(A), the security
interest is deemed to have been transferred on January 1,
1982, when the loan was made and the security interest created, because SP perfected within ten days after the security
interest attached to 60the equipment and became enforceable
between D and SP.
Suppose further that instead of filing on January 5,
1982, SP waits until January 15, 1982, to perfect its security
interest. Now section 547(e)(2)(B) applies and the transfer is
deemed to have been made on January 15, 1982, the time of
UCC period begins. This difference makes no sense. If creditors are misled

at all by the delay it is unlikely that they would be misled from the time the
transfer takes effect between the parties when the debtor-buyer may not be
in possession of the goods. Further the careful secured party may simply
contract to make the transfer take effect at the time of delivery and thus get

the full 10 days recognized in bankruptcy. The Bankruptcy Reform Act
should simply measure the ten day period in purchase money cases from the

time of delivery of the goods.
Hogan, Bankruptcy Reform and Delayed Filing Under the U. C C, 35

ARK.

L.

REV.

35,

46 (1981).
58.

11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).

59. I1U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1980). This section insures that the transfer will be treated as a prepetition transfer for purposes of § 547(b)(4) of the New Act.
11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980) (to be preferential, transfer must be made on,
or within certain periods of time before, the filing of the bankruptcy petition).
60. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980). See In re Church Buildings And
Interiors, Inc., 14 Bankr. 128 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981).
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perfection, for purposes of preference analysis.6'
Finally, suppose that SP never files a financing statement or otherwise perfects its security interest, and that D
files a bankruptcy petition on January 12, 1982. These added facts trigger section 547(e)(2)(C), and the transfer is
deemed to have been made "immediately before" the filing
of the January 12 bankruptcy petition, because the security
interest was not perfected at the time of bankruptcy and the
ten-day grace period had already expired.62
Obviously, section 547(e) can have a critical impact on a
transfer under preference attack. For example, consider the
probable effect of section 547(e) on the three hypotheticals
posed immediately above. The first transfer, which was perfected within the ten-day grace period on January 5, 1982, is
not preferential under section 547(b)(2), because it is deemed
to have been made on January 1, 1982, for contemporaneous, and therefore not antecedent, value (i.e. the loan made
on that date). 63 However, the latter two transfers are probably section 547(b) preferences, because they are deemed to
have been made at times subsequent to the January 1 loan
and therefore are treated as having been given in exchange
for antecedent indebtedness. 64
61. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). See In re Hall, 14 Bankr. 186
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Brimhall, 13 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1981); In re
Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
62. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(2)(C) (Supp. IV 1980).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(2) & (e)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1980).
64. This point assumes that in the second hypothetical the transfer was made
within the appropriate preference period. All of the other elements of a § 547(b) preference appear to have been met. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980). See In re Hall,
14 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Brimhall, 13 Bankr. 942 (Bankr. D.
Idaho 1981); In re Kelley, 3 Bankr. 651 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980). It also discounts
the potential application of the exceptions to the trustee's preference avoiding powers
created by § 547(c). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c) (Supp. IV 1980). For example, in one recent
case, debtor granted secured party a security interest in an automobile on December
10, 1980. This security interest was not perfected until January 12, 1981, more than
30 days later, due to circumstances beyond the control of the secured party. The court
held that § 547(c)(1) protected the transfer from the trustee, because the parties intended a contemporaneous exchange for new value and the exchange was in fact
"substantially contemporaneous." In re Arnett, 13 Bankr. 267 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1981), aft'd, 17 Bankr. 916 (E.D. Tenn. 1982). See also In re Martella, 22 Bankr. 649
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1982); In re Burnette, 14 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981); In re
Hall, 14 Bankr. 186 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981). However, a second line of cases takes a
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The most intriguing application of section 547(e) concerns the principal subject of this article, the floating lien on
after-acquired collateral. Returning to the original hypothetical posed in Section II above, suppose that on January
1, 1982, SP makes a $100,000 loan to D and retains and immediately perfects a security interest in D's present and future inventory. D owns inventory with a value of $50,000 at
the time of the making of the loan, and subsequently acquires additional inventory, worth $20,000, two weeks later,
on January 15, 1982.
The inventory in existence at the time of the making of
the loan triggers an elementary application of section
547(e)(2)(A)-the transfer is deemed to have been made on
January 1, 1982, because the security interest was immediately perfected at the closing of the secured transaction. 65
However, calculating the timing of the transfer of collateral
acquired by D on January 15, 1982, requires resort to more
sophisticated analysis. Although the definition of perfection
contained in section 547(e)(1)(B) is very similar to the "so far
perfected" test under section 60(a)(2) of the Former Act,6 6 a

transfer of a security interest in after-acquired collateral
does not relate back to the time of perfection of the original
security interest under New Act preference law. Instead, a
transfer of a security interest in after-acquired property is
deemed to have been made not earlier than the time the
debtor acquires rights in the collateral.
This scenario, which calls into question the validity in
bankruptcy of all collateral transferred during the preference
period under an after-acquired property clause in a pre-existing security agreement,61 is a consequence of section
547(e)(3) of the New Act.68 Section 547(e)(3) qualifies the
general timing rules discussed above by providing that "a
contrary view and holds that § 547(c)(1) does not protect security interests that are not

perfected within the 10-day grace period following attachment. In re Davis, 22
Bankr.
1982).
65.
66.
67.

68.

644 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982); Matter of Vance, 22 Bankr. 26 (Bankr. D. Idaho
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
See Harrington, supra note 19, at 471.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text.

11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980).
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transfer is not made until the debtor has acquired rights in
the property transferred. '69 Thus, in the example above, the
transfer of the security interest in the January 15 inventory is
deemed to have been made on January 15, 1982, when the

debtor acquired rights in the collateral and the security interest simultaneously attached and became perfected.
The impact of section 547(e)(3) on the floating lien is
dramatic; for purposes of determining whether a security interest in after-acquired collateral is preferential, the relevant

date in connection with the antecedent indebtedness, insolvency and preference period requirements of section 547(b)
is that on which the debtor acquires rights in the collateral,
and not that of perfection of the original security interest.7 °
As a result, most, if not all, security interests attaching to
after-acquired collateral within ninety days of bankruptcy
appear to be section 547(b) preferential transfers.7 '

69. Id This reference tracks a similar reference to the debtor's "rights in the
collateral" contained in U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c), which defines the concept of attachment
under the Code. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c) (1972). See supra notes 14 and 15 and accompanying text. Since the Bankruptcy Reform Act does not contain a formula for determining when a debtor has acquired rights in property for purposes of § 547(e)(3), the
bankruptcy cases will probably look to case law under the Code for guidance. The
concept of rights in the collateral under U.C.C. § 9-203 is not synonymous with title
to, or even possession of, the property. The debtor may have obtained rights in goods
even prior to shipment by the seller, and may have rights in an account even before it
is earned. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, § 23-4, at 917. See also U.C.C.
§§ 2-501(1), 9-106 (1972); U.C.C. § 9-204(2) (1962). For a good discussion of the concept of rights in the collateral in the context of § 547(e)(3) of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act, see Harrington, supra note 19, at 481-85.
70. Assume the original security interest was given in exchange for contemporaneous value, at a time before the preference period, and while the debtor was solvent.
A transfer under preference scrutiny as of such date would be valid against the
trustee, because three of the elements of § 547(b) would be absent. II U.S.C.
§ 547(b)(2)-(4) (Supp. IV 1980). However, if the debtor subsequently acquired collateral during the preference period, § 547(e)(3) would time the transfer as of the date of
acquisition, and the transfer would therefore be made on account of an antecedent
debt, during the preference period, and while the debtor was presumed to be insolvent. 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(2)-(4), (e)(3), (f) (Supp. IV 1980). See In re Diversified
World Investments, Ltd., 12 Bankr. 517 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1981); In re Cox, 10
Bankr. 268 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981); Harrington, supra note 19, at 471.
71. Under § 547(e)(3), such transfers would be made within the preference period, on account of an antecedent debt, and while the debtor is presumed insolvent
under § 547(f). 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(b)(2)-(4), (f) (Supp. IV 1980). See Harrington,
supra note 19, at 472.
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B.

Section 547(c)(5)

i. General Operation
A lender with blinders on looking at section 547(e)(3)
would likely seek out the escape of apoplexy, because he or
she would appear to be witnessing the brutal demise of the
floating lien in bankruptcy. However, section 547(e)(3) does
not operate in a vacuum, and much of what that section
denies floating lien secured parties is restored by section
547(c).
Section 547(c) enacts a number of exceptions to the general rules of preference law in bankruptcy. It recognizes that
certain transactions constituting technical preferences under
section 547(b) should be protected from the reach of the
trustee to the extent necessary to effectuate overriding considerations of policy. 72 Although any or all of the subsections of section 547(c) may, in a given case, spell relief for a
transfer under preference attack, section 547(c)(5) is by far
the most germane exception with respect to after-acquired
inventory and receivables collateral.
Section 547(c)(5) provides:
The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer(5) of a perfected security interest in inventory or a
receivable or the proceeds of either, except to the extent
that the aggregate of all such transfers to the transferee
caused a reduction, as of the date of the filing of the petition and to the prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims, of any amount by which the debt secured
by such security interest exceeded the value of all security interest [sic] for such debt on the later of(A)(i) with respect to a transfer to which
subsection (b)(4)(A) of this section applies, 90
days before the date of the filing of the petition;
or
(ii) with respect to a transfer to which
subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section applies, one
72. See generally WHITE & SUMMERS,supra note 10, §§ 24-4 to 24-5, at 1005-11;
Nimmer, supra note 46, at 296-302.
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year before the date of the filing of the petition;
and
(B) the date on which new value was first
given under the security agreement creating
such security interest."
It is critically important to recognize that section 547(c)(5)
does not give the bankruptcy trustee any affirmative avoidance powers. Rather, it has quite the opposite effect-it provides an exception from avoidance for certain transfers that
would otherwise be vulnerable under section 547(b). Thus,
in any given case, it is not necessary to reach the question of
application of section 547(c)(5) until after the trustee has met
his burden of proving all of the necessary elements of a preference75 under section 547(b).76 If the trustee fails to prove
that a section 547(b) preference has been made, judgment
should be rendered for the transferee; only if the trustee
meets his burden under section 547(b) is it necessary to determine whether section 547(c) exempts all or part of the
transfer from avoidance.
Section 547(c)(5) applies only to transfers of perfected
73. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
74. See Nimmer, supra note 46, at 318; Young, supra note 5, at 225. Some courts
and commentators have failed to discern the distinct functions of §§ 547(b) and
547(c)(5). See In re The Music House, Inc., 11 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980);
Kaye, supra note 5, at 211; Harrington, supra note 19, at 474.
75. The trustee has the burden of alleging and proving by a fair preponderance
of the evidence all of the requisite elements of an alleged preferential transfer. If the
trustee fails to meet his burden, no preference has been established under § 547(b).
See Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658 F.2d 504, 507 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Camp
Rockhill, Inc., 12 Bankr. 829, 831-32 n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981); In re Burnham, 12
Bankr. 286, 297 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1981); In re Conn, 9 Bankr. 431, 434 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1981); 4 COLLIER, supra note 30, 547.55 Although § 547(0 of the New Act
creates a rebuttable presumption that the debtor was insolvent during the 90-day period immediately preceding bankruptcy, the ultimate burden of persuasion on the
issue of the debtor's insolvency remains with the trustee. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
76. For example, if the debtor was solvent at the time he acquired collateral, the
secured party has not received a preference, because one of the requisite elements of
§ 547(b) has not been satisfied. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Therefore, in
theory there is no need to apply § 547(c)(5) to such a transaction. However, in practice, counsel for the transferee might decide that it is easier to exempt a given transaction under § 547(c)(5) than to rebut the presumption of insolvency under §§ 547(b)(3)
and 547(0. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
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security interests in inventory, 77 receivables, 78 or the proceeds of either. 79 Transfers of other kinds of collateral, including security interests in business equipment, receive no
protection from the trustee's avoidance powers. 80 Thus, for
example, all business equipment attaching to a financer's
floating lien within ninety days before bankruptcy is probably subject to avoidance by the trustee as a preferential
transfer,8 ' unless it is protected by some other provision of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act.82
77. "Inventory" is defined by the Bankruptcy Reform Act as:
personal property leased or furnished, held for sale or lease, or to be furnished under a contract for service, raw materials, work in process, or materials used or consumed in a business, including farm products such as crops
or livestock, held for sale or lease.
II U.S.C. § 547(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980). The main difference between this definition of
inventory and that contained in the U.C.C. is that under the latter farm products are
not classified as inventory.
78. A "receivable" is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right
has been earned by performance." II U.S.C. § 547(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). Again, the
Bankruptcy Reform Act definition of receivable is broader than its closest U.C.C.
counterpart, the definition of account as "any right to payment for goods sold or
leased or for services rendered which i not evidenced by an instrumentor chattelpaper,
whether or not it has been earned by performance." U.C.C. § 9-106 (1972). See Henson, supra note 10, at 97. See also U.C.C. § 9-105(b) & (i) (1972); U.C.C. § 9-106
(1962).
79. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). For a brief survey of the treatment of
proceeds under § 547 of the New Act, see Nimmer, supra note 46, at 325-29.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE (1970), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra

note 5, at 215; B. WEINTRAUB & A. RESNICK, BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL 7.05[8],
at 7-21 and 7-22 (1980). This limitation reflects Congress' appreciation of the commercial significance of the after-acquired collateral clause in the context of inventory
and accounts financing. See supra notes 40 and 41 and accompanying text. Since
business equipment does not revolve in the ordinary course of the debtor's business,
equipment financers do not generally rely on after-acquired collateral clauses when
calculating credit risks. Thus, § 547(c)(5) meets the most important requirements of
commercial lenders without sacrificing unnecessarily the bankruptcy policy of equality and fairness to all creditors. See supra notes 43-51 and accompanying text; Note,
supra note 42, at 248.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) & (e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text supra.
82. For example, suppose that during the preference period the secured party
releases a valid-in-bankruptcy security interest in a particular item of equipment to
enable the debtor to trade it in for new equipment collateral. If the released equipment is at least equal in value to the new equipment, there is no depletion of the
debtor's estate and thus no preference. 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2), (b)(2), (b)(5) & (c)(l)
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Although section 547(c)(5) is frequently said to adopt
an "improvement in position" test, 83 it actually enacts a two
point reduction in deficiency formulation that works as follows in the typical case: first, calculate the collateral deficiency 84 as of the date ninety days before bankruptcy;
second, calculate the collateral deficiency as of the date of
the filing of the bankruptcy petition; and third, calculate the
amount of the reduction in collateral deficiency by subtracting the product of the second calculation from the product of the first calculation. The figure resulting from this
arithmatic process designates the maximum extent of the
trustee's power to avoid a security interest in inventory or
receivables under section 547(b).
Section 547(c)(5) therefore requires the secured status of
floating lien creditors to be compared as of two points in
time. Fluctuations in the interval between the two measuring points are irrelevant. The second of the two relevant
dates will always be the date of the filing of the bankruptcy
petition.85 Depending on the facts of the particular case, the
initial measuring point will be one of three possible dates.
In the great majority of cases, the date ninety days before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition will be the relevant time for
547.22. See also II U.S.C.
(Supp. IV 1980). See 4 COLLIER, supra note 30,
§ 547(c)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). However, where the new equipment is of greater value
than the old, the trustee may be able to establish an avoidable preference for the
difference in value between the old and new securities. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 30,
547.22. But see Nimmer, supra note 46, at 312-13.
83. See, e.g., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 374; WHITE & SUMMERS, supra
note 10, § 24-5, at 1009.
84. Use of the term "collateral deficiency" in the text refers to the "amount by
which the debt secured by such security interest exceed[s] the value of all security
interest [sic] for such debt." 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). For example, if
on any relevant date the amount of the secured obligation is $ 100,000 and the value of
all collateral is $75,000, the amount of the collateral deficiency is $25,000. Apparently
all types of security, not just inventory, receivables and proceeds thereof, are to be
taken into account when calculating the amount of the collateral deficiency. It may
therefore be to the advantage of inventory and accounts financers to negotiate for
additional kinds of collateral when extending credit to commercial borrowers. See E.
REILEY, GUIDEBOOK To SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 8.7(c)(1), at

8-21 (1981); Reiley, Secured Creditorsand the Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 14 U.S.F. L.
REV. 341, 369 (1980).
85. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
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the first calculation of collateral deficiency. 86 However, if the

preferred creditor is an insider and the transfer was made
"between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing
of the petition", 7 the initial section 547(c)(5) calculation will
be made as of "one year before the date of the filing of the

petition." 88 Finally, if new value was first given by the secured party after the date which would otherwise be the appropriate initial measuring point, section 547(c)(5)(B)
provides that the initial calculation shall be made as of "the
date on which new value was first given under the security
agreement creating such security interest. 89
Section 547(c)(5)'s complexity is deceptive, and many
courts and commentators have failed to discern its more abstruse features. 90 The easy applications are almost childishly
simple, and serve as bait to lure the unwary legal analyst
into the trap set by its difficult applications. For example,

where the amount of the outstanding indebtedness remains
static at all relevant times, section 547(c)(5) generally produces a clear answer to questions regarding the extent of the

trustee's avoiding power. The following hypothetical is illustrative. Suppose that ninety days before bankruptcy D,
the owner of a sporting goods store, owes SP $100,000 under
a pre-existing loan secured by present and after-acquired in86. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(A)(i) (Supp. IV 1980).
87. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
89. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). Suppose, for example, that on
January 1, 1982, SP loans D $10,000 and obtains an adequate security agreement
covering D's present and future inventory. D then files a chapter 7 petition on February 1, 1982. The two measuring points under section 547(c)(5) will be January 1,
1982, the date on which new value (i.e. the $10,000 loan) was first given under the
security agreement, and February 1, 1982, the date D filed its petition in bankruptcy.
Id Under these facts, it is obvious that January I, 1982, must be chosen as the initial
point of calculation, because the secured relationship between D and SP had not yet
been established on the otherwise applicable date (i.e., 90 days before bankruptcy).
90. See, e.g., In re Lackow Brothers, Inc., 19 Bankr. 601 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982);
In re The Music House, Inc., 11 Bankr. 139 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980); In re Ken Gardner
Ford Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 644-45 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981) aff'd, 23 Bankr. 743
(E.D. Tenn. 1982); Clark, Preferences Under the Old and New Bankruptcy Acts, 12
U.C.C. L.J. 154, 178 (1979); Cohen, "Value" Judgments: Accounts Receivable Financing and Voidable Preferences Under the New Bankruptcy Code, 66 MINN. L. REV. 639,
650-51 (1982); Shanor, A New Deal For Secured Creditors in Bankruptcy, 28 EMORY
L.J. 587, 610 (1979).
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ventory. On this date, SP has a perfected security interest in
D's $50,00091 inventory of football gear. By the date on

which D files his chapter 7 petition, the stock of inventory
has completely turned over and the $100,000 loan is secured

under the after-acquired property clause by $75,000 worth of
baseball equipment. What is the total amount of the
trustee's preference recovery under section 547?
The first question to be answered is whether the trustee
can prove that SP has received a section 547(b) preference.

The answer to this question is almost certainly that SP has
received a $75,000 preferential transfer of a perfected security interest in the baseball gear, because under section
547(e)(3) of the New Act this inventory was transferred to

SP during the ninety-day preference period (ie. at the time

D acquired rights in the collateral), 92 on account of an antecedent debt (i.e. the pre-existing loan of $100,000), 9 3 and
94
while D was presumed to be insolvent under section 547(f).

However, under an elemental application of section
547(c)(5), the trustee's power to avoid this transfer is limited
to $25,000, because SP has improved its secured position
only to such extent. 95
A second reasonably simple problem under section

547(c)(5) is the case of the floating lien creditor who is fully
secured at the ninety-day measuring point. Such a creditor
will generally be exempt from preference attack under sec91. In this article all questions of valuation of collateral will be assumed. In
practice, the parties and the courts will have to establish these figures with only minimal guidance from the Bankruptcy Reform Act, a task which will almost certainly
raise many difficult problems of an accounting nature. See Cohen, supra note 90, at
651-65; Harrington, supra note 19, at 473 n.99; Young, supra note 5, at 234.
92. 11 U.S.C. § 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
93. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
94. 11 U.S.C. § 547(1) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
The trustee should easily be able to establish the remaining elements of an avoidable
preference. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(1) & (5) (Supp. IV 1980); supra notes 8 and 10 and
accompanying text.
95. The transfer involves a perfected security interest in inventory and the reduction in collateral deficiency between the 90-day measuring point ($100,000 debt minus
$50,000 security equals a collateral deficiency of $50,000) and the date of the petition
($100,000 debt minus $75,000 security equals a collateral deficiency of $25,000) is
equal to $25,000. See supra notes 83 & 84 and accompanying text.
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tion 547(c)(5) with respect to inventory or receivables collateral acquired by the debtor during the preference period; by
definition there is no collateral deficiency as of the initial
measuring point,96 and the trustee will therefore be unable to

demonstrate the necessary improvement in position as of the
date of the petition. 97 Thus, it is advisable for floating lienors to police their loans to insure that they remain adequately collateralized at all times. Of course, to the extent
that a secured party has a good-in-bankruptcy security interest in collateral with a value greater than the amount of the
secured indebtedness, the excess will be available to the
trustee as part of the debtor's bankruptcy estate.98
Although in the easy case section 547(c)(5) is capable of
mechanical application, understandable even by those of us
who have not been schooled in the new math, it can become
almost a medieval instrument of torture when presented to
students by a law professor with an active legal imagination.
Suppose, for example, that ninety days before bankruptcy D
owes SP $100,000 under a pre-existing loan secured by present and after-acquired inventory. On this date, SP has a perfected security interest in D's $30,000 inventory of football
gear. Eighty-nine days before bankruptcy, SP loans D an
additional $30,000 under a future advance clause contained
in the original loan and security agreement thereby increasing the amount of the secured obligation to $130,000. By
sixty days before bankruptcy, D's stock of inventory has
completely turned over and the $130,000 loan is secured
under the after-acquired property clause by $30,000 worth of
baseball bats and gloves. Next, on the day before bankruptcy, D makes a $60,000 loan payment to SP. Finally, on
the date D files his chapter 7 petition, the outstanding bal96. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. 1979). See supra note 84.
97. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See Levin, An Introduction to the
Trustee'sAvoiding Powers, 53 Am. BANKR. L.J. 173, 188 (1979); Macey, supra note 5,
at 700; Nimmer, supra note 46, at 319. This remains true even if the value of the
collateral dips below the amount of the debt during the 90-day period following the
initial measuring point. See Levin, supra, at 188; Macey, supra note 5, at 700.
98. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See Countryman, Bankruptcy Preferences-Current Law and Proposed Changes, 11 U.C.C. L.J. 95, 97-98 (1978).
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ance of the loan is $70,000, and the value of D's inventory is
$50,000.
What is the total amount of the trustee's preference recovery under section 547? Depending upon how one reads
section 547, there are at least four possible answers to this

question: $50,000, $110,000, $80,000, and $60,000.
A superficial reading of the two-point test of section
547(c)(5) might suggest a recoverable preference of only
$50,000, because that is the amount of the improvement in
SP's secured position between the ninety-day point and the
date of bankruptcy. 99 This solution fails to take into account

the $60,000 loan payment made by D to SP on the day
before bankruptcy, which appears to meet all°°of the requirements of a preference under section 547(b).1

99. The collateral deficiency 90 days before bankruptcy was $70,000 ($100,000
debt minus $30,000 security). On the date of bankruptcy, the deficiency had decreased to $20,000 ($70,000 debt minus $50,000 security). It follows that the amount
of the improvement in SP's secured position is $50,000. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp.
IV 1980). See Clark, supra note 90, at 178; Cohen, supra note 90, at 650-5 1; Shanor,
supra note 90, at 610.
100. It is a transfer of property of the debtor made to a creditor (i.e., SP), on
account of an antecedent debt (i.e., the outstanding loan of $130,000), while the
debtor was presumed to be insolvent under § 547(0, within 90 days before bankruptcy, and which enabled SP, who was not fully secured, to receive more than it
would have received in a chapter 7 distribution had the payment not been made (assuming that the bankruptcy distribution to general creditors is less than 100%). II
U.S.C. § 547(b), (e) & (f) (Supp. IV 1980). See Barash v. Public Finance Corp., 658
F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981); In re Satterla, 15 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1981); In
re Hawkins Mfg., Inc., I1 Bankr. 512 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); In re McCormick, 5
Bankr. 726 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1980). For example, consider Professor Clark's solution to the hypothetical posed in his excellent article on preferences under the Bankruptcy Reform Act:
. . . if a $20,000 debt is secured by $17,000 in collateral ninety days before
bankruptcy, there would be no preference if, on the date of the petition, the
debt was $9,000 and the collateral $6,000. Since the deficiency was $3,000
on both dates, there has been no "improvement in position."
Clark, supra note 90, at 178. Professor Clark's analysis of the problem fails to take
into account the $11,000 loan payment made to the secured party during the preference period. This payment appears to be preferential under § 547(b) (assuming that
the debt was undersecured at all relevant times), and it is not protected by § 547(c)(5)
which protects only transfers of perfected security interests in inventory or receivables
and the proceeds of either. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) & (c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). Without
additional facts, it is impossible to determine whether one of the other subsections of
§ 547(c) or some other provision of the New Act would apply to protect some or all of
the loan payment from the trustee's avoiding powers.
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A somewhat more careful reading of section 547 would
recognize that there are two different types of preferential
transfers involved in this problem-a $60,000 payment of
the loan' 0 and a $50,000 perfected security interest in afteracquired collateral. 0 2 Using this analysis as his starting
point, the trustee could argue that the $60,000 payment is a
preference for which no protection is given under section
547(c), 10 3 and that the $50,000 security interest in D's afteracquired inventory is fully avoidable (it appears to be a section 547(b) preference and is not exempt under section
547(c)(5) because there has been a $50,000 improvement in
position).' °4 Under this view, the trustee's total recovery
would be $110,000.
A still more sophisticated analysis of the problem would
go forward from this point to focus on the language in section 547(c)(5) limiting the trustee's power to avoid otherwise
preferential transfers of inventory and receivables to the extent that such transfers "caused" an improvement in position
under the two-point test. 0 5 SP could therefore argue that its
security interest in the after-acquired inventory may be
avoided only insofar as the value of its collateral increased
between the two relevant dates (i.e. only to the extent of
$20,000), because only to such extent was the improvement
in its secured status caused by the transfers of after-acquired
security. 10 6 This theory produces a net recovery by the
trustee under section 547 of $80,000, i.e. the $60,000 preferential loan payment and the $20,000 improvement.
The best reading of the preference provision takes the
analysis yet one more step and recognizes that under the second and third theories discussed above double liability is imposed upon SP in connection with the $60,000 loan payment,
101. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
102. Since D's inventory completely turned over during the 90-day prepetition
period, all of SP's perfected security interest in the collateral was "transferred" during
the preference period. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) & (e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra
notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
104. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
105. II U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
106. Id See Nimmer, supra note 46, at 321-22.
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i.e. not only is the $60,000 payment recoverable by the
trustee as a preference, but it is being taken into account in
calculating whether SP has improved its position under section 547(c)(5). Thus, if the $60,000 payment had not been
made, the amount of the debt on the date of bankruptcy
would have been $130,000, the deficiency would have been
$80,000 (i.e. $130,000 debt minus $50,000 security), there
would have been no improvement in SP's secured status
(since the deficiency would have increased from $70,000 to
$80,000 between the two relevant dates), and there would
of after-acquired intherefore be no recoverable preference
°7
547(c)(5).
section
ventory under
The ultimate solution to this problem accords with the
analysis last mentioned, and is distilled from the relationship
of section 547(c)(5) on the one hand, and sections 502(h) and
550(c) of the New Act on the other. Under section 502(h),
SP's claim arising from the trustee's recovery of the $60,000
preferential loan payment is treated "the same as if such
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition,"
i.e. it is treated as a $60,000 prepetition claim. 10 8 SP should
therefore argue that its $60,000 claim in connection with the
trustee's recovery of the preferential loan payment should be
taken into account under section 547(c)(5) in calculating the
deficiency existing on the date of the filing of the petition.
The trustee's recovery under this analysis would be limited
to the $60,000 preferential payment, because under section
547(c)(5) there would be no improvement in position and
thus no recoverable transfer of after-acquired inventory. 0 9
This analysis is bolstered by section 550(c), which provides
that in recovering, inter alia, preferential transfers under sec107.
108.

11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
It U.S.C. § 502(h) (Supp. IV 1980). See 3

COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY

502.08 (15th ed. 1979).
109. The collateral deficiency ninety days before bankruptcy was $70,000
($100,000 debt minus $30,000 security). As of the date of bankruptcy, the recomputed
collateral deficiency is $80,000 ($70,000 debt plus $60,000 recovered preferential payment minus $50,000 security). The creditor's secured status therefore did not improve
between the two relevant measuring points, and § 547(c)(5) thus exempts all of the

inventory from the trustee's preference attack. I I U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
See Nimmer, supra note 46, at 322.
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tion 547 the "trustee is entitled to only a single satisfaction. . . ."'"O It is also consistent with the requirement in

section 547(c)(5) that a transfer of a perfected security interest in after-acquired collateral is avoidable only when it

prejudices the interests "of other creditors holding unsecured
claims.""' To the extent that the collateral deficiency on the
date of bankruptcy has been reduced by a preferential loan
payment recoverable for the benefit of the estate by the
trustee, the bankruptcy estate has not been depleted and
other creditors of the debtor have therefore not been
prejudiced thereby. Finally, the suggested interpretation

takes into account the interface of all relevant sections of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act, and effectuates the policy of section

547(c)(5) by insulating the floating lien in inventory and receivables from the trustee's avoiding power where there has
been no improvement in the aggregate secured position of
the floating lien creditor at the end of the ninety-day pre-

bankruptcy period." 2
ii.

Prejudice Provision

The trustee is not home free under section 547(c)(5)
when he or she has established the requisite reduction in the
110. 11 U.S.C. § 550(c) (Supp. IV 1980). Cf. 4 COLLIER, supra note 30,
553.08[31.
11l.11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
112. See Nimmer, supra note 46, at 301, 321-22. The same analysis should apply
when a creditor that is secured by both inventory and equipment improves its position
as a result of the debtor's acquisition of new equipment during the preference period.
Suppose, for example, that 90 days before bankruptcy D owes SP $100,000 under a
pre-existing loan secured by present and after-acquired inventory and equipment. On
this date, SP has a perfected security interest in $30,000 worth of inventory and
$10,000 worth of business equipment. Subsequently, D acquires additional equipment, and at the bankruptcy -day measuring point SP's $100,000 claim is secured by
$30,000 worth of inventory and $30,000 worth of equipment. The trustee should be
able to avoid the $20,000 security interest in the equipment acquired by the debtor
during the preference period, because it appears to be a § 547(b) preference and is not
protected by § 547(c)(5). See supra notes 81 & 82 and accompanying text. However,
the trustee should not be permitted to avoid any of SP's security interest in inventory,
because the $20,000 improvement in position resulted from the debtor's acquisition of
the new equipment, not from after-acquired inventory. Again, since the trustee is
able to avoid the $20,000 security interest in the new equipment, the bankruptcy estate has not been depleted and there has been no improvement in SP's aggregate
secured position at the end of the 90-day period.
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amount of the collateral deficiency; he or she must further

demonstrate that the improvement in position was "to the
prejudice of other creditors holding unsecured claims."'' 3
Essentially, this means that the trustee must show that the
effect of the improvement was to decrease the amount of
property otherwise available for liquidation and distribution
to unsecured creditors.
Although the Bankruptcy Reform Act does not provide

any guidance as to the types of transactions protected or denied protection from the trustee by the prejudice provision,
when a floating lienor improves its position as a result of
new units of collateral acquired by the debtor during the

preference period, the trustee should have little difficulty establishing that the after-acquired security interest, if recognized in bankruptcy, will deplete the bankruptcy estate at
the expense of unsecured creditors.' 14 However, mere appreciation in value of collateral should escape the preference

net. Thus, for example, increases in the value of collateral
resulting from the harvesting of crops, completion of work in
process; generation of accounts receivable upon sale of inventory, and seasonal fluctuations in value of collateral
would be protected unless the trustee succeeds in establish-

ing that they caused an improvement in position to the detri113. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). There seems to be some confusion as
to the locus of the burden of proof under § 547(c)(5). One recent case holds that once
the trustee has established a § 547(b) preferential transfer "the creditor has the burden
of proving that it is protected by one of the exceptions." In re Ken Gardner Ford
Sales, Inc., 10 Bankr. 632, 646 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1981). Another case holds that the
trustee has the burden of establishing every element of a preference, and that this
burden requires the trustee to establish the requisite improvement in position under
§ 547(c)(5). In re The Music House, Inc., IIBankr. 139, 141 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1980).
See also 4 COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE

64.08[2][e], at p. 64-52 to 64-53

(19810. Although § 547(c)(5) is silent on the point, an earlier version of the provision
expressly stated that the "transferee has the burden of establishing that he has not
improved his position under the rules above stated." NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprintedin HOUSE REPORT, supra

note 5, at 211 (proposed § 60a(4)(IV)). The drafters of this proposal apparently believed that the burden should be on the transferee to show no improvement because
"presumably [the transferee] has all the relevant records." Id, at 216. The author of
this article is not convinced that actual business practice justifies such an assumption.
114. See Young, supra note 5, at 234.
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ment of the estate. "15

Where the improvement in position is caused solely by
market forces, such as in the case of gasoline reserves held
by an oil company during a rising market, the trustee's preference attack should fail for two reasons. First, it is difficult
to conceive of the'increased value as constituting a "transfer
of property of the debtor" as required of an avoidable preference by section 547(b)'16 -assuming the gasoline was acquired by the debtor prior to the preference period, the mere
fact that the gasoline has become more valuable during the
ninety-day period does not appear to fit within the definition17
of transfer contained in section 101(40) of the New Act."
Second, even if we assume that the trustee can establish a
section 547(b) transfer, the improvement in position caused
by the additional market value of the pre-existing gasoline
does not result in any depletion of the8 debtor's estate to the
disadvantage of unsecured creditors."1

However, where the increased value is caused, at least
in part, by expenditures made by the debtor, such as in the
case of completion of work in process, the question is a
much more difficult one. Here, the trustee could argue that
the expenditures made by the debtor during the preference
period constitute section 547(b) preferential transfers of
property of the debtor, and that, at least to the extent of such
expenditures, the resulting improvement in position causes a
115. See COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R.
Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,pt. 1, at 207-08 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].

116. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (Supp. IV 1980). See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10,
at 1010-1I; Clark, supra note 90, at 179-80.
117. 11 U.S.C. § 101(40) (Supp. IV 1980) defines the term "transfer" as
• . * every mode, direct or indirect, absolute or conditional, voluntary or
involuntary, of disposing of or parting with property or with an interest in
property, including retention of title as a security interest.
Thus, although the initial acquisition by the debtor of the gasoline subject to the security interest is certainly a transfer, the subsequent increase in the value of that same
gasoline does not appear to constitute a second transfer. See In re Nivens, 22 Bankr.
287, 293-4 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982).
118. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 1010. But see Note, supra note 42,
at 254 (arguing that an unanticipated upward swing in value gives rise to a "classic
windfall" which should be shared equally by all creditors).
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depletion of the debtor's bankruptcy estate to the prejudice
of unsecured creditors. 19 Some commentators have suggested that all of the improvement resulting from such expenditures by the debtor, including any profits generated as
20
a result thereof, should be avoidable by the trustee.
Others have argued that, except perhaps in unusual cases,
none of the increased
value should be recovered for the ben2
efit of the estate.' '
Perhaps the best solution to the problem is the compromise proposed by Professor Homer Kripke in a 1970 letter to
the Gilmore Committee: the floating lienor may retain the
entire value of the finished goods minus the costs expended
by the debtor in finishing them. 22 Professor Kripke's solution is more in accordance with the policy of section
547(c)(5), which attempts to strike a delicate balance between the interests of secured and unsecured creditors, than
are the all-or-nothing propositions discussed above; it recognizes and protects the expectations of floating lien creditors 2 3 up to the point where those expectations potentially
cause a depletion in the debtor's estate during the preference
period to the detriment of unsecured creditors. However, it
is difficult to predict how the courts will handle these
problems when confronted with the multitude of factual sit119. The argument here is based on the somewhat optimistic assumption that had
the expenditures not been made to complete the work in process, they would have
remained unencumbered in the debtor's possession and thus available to unsecured
creditors in bankruptcy. But see Clark, supra note 90, at 180 ("...
it is playing with
metaphysics to say that a 'transfer' has occurred").
120. See Kaye, supra note 5, at 211; Macey, supra note 5, at 701.
121. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 1010-11; Clark, supra note 90, at
180-81. Cf. Hogan, supra note 26, at 558-59.
122. See Letter from Professor Homer Kripke to the Gilmore Committee, September 17, 1970, reprintedinCOMMISSION REPORT, supra note 115, at 210. Cf. Meinhard, Greeff& Co. v. Edens, 189 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1951).
123. When a creditor advances money secured by raw materials and halffinished products, there is an expectation that the goods will be completed
and sold for value. Often when the security interest is created the collateral
in the unfinished state is worth only a fraction of its potential value. To
deny the creditor the benefit of the appreciation that was at the base of the
bargain would be unfair. In addition, the other creditors are not unduly
prejudiced by allowing the creditor the benefit of an increase that is consistent with ordinary business dealings.
Note, supra note 42, at 253 (footnotes omitted).
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uations that could arise; it is to be hoped that the judges will
apply the Kripke formula not only to goods which are in the
manufacturing process at the beginning of the preference period, but also to raw materials, which are converted to

finished products, and crops and cattle, which are cared for,
fertilized,
fattened, or harvested, during the ninety-day
24
1

period.

iii.

Application to Insiders

As discussed above, although in the typical case the initial date of calculation under the two-point improvement in
position test is ninety days before bankruptcy, when the
transferee is a statutory insider 125 of the debtor different
124. Attempts have been made to distinguish goods which are raw materials at
the beginning of the preference period from those which are already in process at
such time. For example, the Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States appears to support the Kripke formula as to work in process, while favoring
recovery by the trustee of the entire improvement resulting from conversion of raw
materials into finished products during the preference period. See CoMMISsION REPORT, supra note 115, at 209-10. See also Skilton, Security Interests in After-Acquired
Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 1974 Wis. L. REV. 925, 1008 (1974)
(quoting from letter of Professor Kripke to Professor Skilton, dated October 9, 1974).
125. 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (Supp. IV 1980) defines the term "insider" as follows:
"insider" includes
(A) if the debtor is an individual(i) relative of the debtor or of a general partner of the debtor;
(ii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partners;
(iii) general partner of the debtor; or
(iv) corporation of which the debtor is a director, officer, or person in
control;
(B) if the debtor is a corporation(i) director of the debtor;
(ii) officer of the debtor;
(iii) person in control of the debtor;
(iv) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(v) general partner of the debtor; or
(vi) relative of a general partner, director, officer, or person in control
of the debtor;
(C) if the debtor is a partnership(i) general partner in the debtor;
(ii) relative of a general partner in, general partner of, or person in
control of the debtor;
(iii) partnership in which the debtor is a general partner;
(iv) general partner of the debtor; or
(v) person in control of the debtor;
(D) if the debtor is a municipality, elected official of the debtor or relative
of an elected official of the debtor;
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rules apply. In fact, it will probably be necessary to make
two separate deficiency calculations when an inventory or
receivables floating lienor is an insider of the debtor.
Consider, for example, the following hypothetical. Suppose that one year before bankruptcy D owes SP, a statutory
insider, $100,000 under a pre-existing loan secured by present and after-acquired inventory. On this date, SP has a perfected security interest in D's inventory with a value of
$10,000.126 Ninety days before bankruptcy D still owes SP
$100,000; however, D has acquired additional inventory and
the value of the collateral securing the loan is $80,000. 127 Finally, on the date D files his bankruptcy petition, the outstanding balance of the loan remains $100,000, and the value
of D's inventory is $95,000.128 What is the extent of the
trustee's preference power on these facts?
The trustee will almost certainly be able to avoid SP's
security interest to the extent of $15,000. Furthermore, if the
trustee is able to meet the additional burdens imposed by
section 547 with respect to insider preferences made between
ninety days and one year before bankruptcy, he or she may
be able to further avoid SP's security interest by as much as
an additional $70,000. This solution requires two computations of improvement in position, and also raises complicated questions concerning the timing of transfers of SP's
perfected security interest in D's inventory.
The first computation is a familiar one by now and
should not require detailed explanation. It is a simple appli(E) affiliate, or insider of an affiliate as if such affiliate were the debtor; and
(F) managing agent of the debtor.
Since the term "insider" is defined inclusively, it is possible that other persons or
entities having a close relationship with the debtor will be treated as insiders by the
courts. See In re Montanino, 15 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1981); 4 COLLIER,Supra
note 30, 547,29.
126. Thus, the collateral deficiency as of this date is $90,000 ($100,000 debt minus
$10,000 security). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See supra note 84.
127. Thus, the collateral deficiency as of this date has been reduced to $20,000
($100,000 debt minus $80,000 security). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). See
supra note 84.
128. Thus, the collateral deficiency as of this date has been further reduced to
$5,000 ($100,000 debt minus $95,000 security). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
See supra note 84.
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cation of the elements of a typical preference under section
547(b) and the ninety-day, two-point improvement test of
section 547(c)(5). 129 Since D acquired at least $15,000 worth
of new inventory during the ninety-day preference period,
and since the other elements of a preference appear to exist
as to this collateral, the trustee should be able to recover the
full amount of the $15,000 improvement arising between the
ninety-day measuring point and the bankruptcy-day measuring point.
In addition, because SP is an insider, the trustee is also
entitled to recover so much more of SP's security interest as
is avoidable under sections 547(b)(4)(B) and 547(c)(5)(A)(ii).
Again, because section 547(c)(5) only operates after a section
547(b) preferential transfer has been established, the critical
inquiry is how much of SP's perfected security interest in D's
inventory is preferential under section 547(b)(4)(B)? No
clear answer to this question is possible without more facts
than were given in the hypothetical. The trustee will need to
show, in addition to the usual elements of a preference, that
the transfer was made "between 90 days and one year before
the date of the filing of the petition,"' 30 and that SP was an
insider' 3 1 who had "reasonable cause to believe the debtor

was insolvent at the time of such transfer."' 13 2 In addition,
the trustee will be required to meet his burden of proving
129. Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act, transfers made to insiders during the,
normal 90-day preference period are treated the same as transfers made to other persons. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 30, 1 547.29.
130. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980).
131. The facts of the hypothetical assume that SP is an insider of D.
132. The "reasonable cause" requirement retained under the Bankruptcy Reform
Act for insider preferences is basically the same element required of all preferences
under the Former Act. See 4 COLLIER, supra note 30, 547.30. Although the "reasonable cause" requirement was all too frequently an insurmountable hurdle for the
trustee under the Former Act, (see HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178), it should not
prove to be a major difficulty under the New Act because the "special relationship of
the debtor to the insider should make it relatively easy for the trustee to demonstrate
that the insider-transferee had reason to know of the debtor's insolvency." Macey,
supra note 5, at 702. See In re Montanino, 15 Bankr. 307 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1981).
However, in at least two recent insider preference cases the trustee has failed to establish the reasonable cause to believe requirement. See In re Gruber Bottling Works,
Inc., 16 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982); In re Roco Corp., 15 Bankr. 813 (Bankr.
D. R.I. 1981), aft'd in part and vacated in part, 21 Bankr. 429 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982).
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that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer unaided by section 547(f), which raises a presumption of insolvency only during the ninety-day period. 33 If the trustee
fails to meet any of these additional requirements, he or she
has failed to show an avoidable insider preference and there

is no need to resort to section 547(c)(5). For example, if D's
inventory had completely turned over during the ninety-day
period preceding bankruptcy, none of the inventory subject
to SP's security interest at the time of bankruptcy would
have been transferred "between 90 days and one year before

the date of the filing of the petition."'' 34 Alternatively, if the
trustee is unable to prove that D was insolvent, or that SP
had reasonable cause to believe that D was insolvent, at the
time of any transfer shown to have been made during the
133. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. IV 1980). See In re Camp Rockhill, Inc., 12
Bankr. 829 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). As under the Former Act, proving insolvency
without the benefit of the statutory presumption is a very difficult burden. See HOUSE
REPORT, supra note 5, at 178; Levin, supra note 97, at 185.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (Supp. IV 1980). If we assume that D was insolvent
at all times on and after the date one year before bankruptcy, and that SP had reasonable cause to believe that D was insolvent during such time, it becomes difficult to
accept the conclusion that the trustee is limited to recovery of the $15,000 90-day
improvement simply because the collateral completely turned over during the final 90
days before bankruptcy. However, such an interpretation is required by a literal
reading of § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii), which gives the trustee the benefit of the one-year measuring point only with respect to insider transfers occurring between 90 days and one
year before bankruptcy under § 547(b)(4)(B). 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV
1980). And, since under the assumption the collateral completely turned over within
the last 90 days before bankruptcy, none of SP's security interest in D's inventory was
transferred during the one-year to 90-day insider preference period. 11 U.S.C.
§ 547(e)(3) (Supp. IV 1980). The results produced by such construction are inconsistent with sound bankruptcy preference policy. Section 547(b)(4)(B) is designed to
provide additional protection to unsecured creditors against transfers to insiders, because insiders may be in a position to manipulate the affairs of the debtor in order to
escape preference attack. For example, an insider might be able to cause the debtor
to delay filing a petition in bankruptcy long enough to insure that a particular transfer
benefitting the insider is outside of the normal preference period. See B. WEINTRAUB
& A. RESNICK, supra note 80, 1 7.05[2][d]. Insider manipulation is en a greater
problem in the context of floating lien financing, because the insider may also be able
to control the timing of acquisition and disposition of collateral by the debtor. Moreover, the obvious intention of § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) is to catch in the preference net the
entire one-year improvement accruing to a floating lienor who is an insider with reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is insolvent. In this regard, it is hoped that
the bankruptcy courts will be sensitive to the purpose, as well as the literal language,
of § 547(c)(5), and interpret the section in a manner which permits the trustee to recover the entire amount of the one-year improvement for the benefit of the estate.

1982]

BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

again there would be no section
insider preference 3period,
5
547(b) preference.
However, if we assume that the trustee can demonstrate
the elements of an insider preference under section 547(b), it
is then necessary to make a second computation of improvement in position under section 547(c)(5). For example, assume the trustee establishes that $70,000 of the inventory
subject to SP's security interest at the time of bankruptcy
was acquired by D between ninety days and one year before
bankruptcy, and that the trustee is otherwise able to meet his
burden of establishing a section 547(b) insider preference. A
second computation of improvement would now be necessary under section 547(c)(5) pursuant to which SP's collateral deficiency as of the date one year before bankruptcy
would be compared to that existing on the date of the filing
of the petition. 136 Under this analysis, SP has improved its
position by $85,000 and the trustee would therefore be empowered to avoid SP's security interest in the entire $70,000
pool of inventory acquired during the insider preference period. 137 Thus, since the trustee is also entitled to avoid a
$15,000 improvement under section 547(c)(5)(A)(i), 138 the total amount of the preference recovery would be $85,000.
135. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(3), (b)(4)(B) & () (Supp. IV 1980).
136. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) (Supp. IV 1980).
137. Id Again, since § 547(c)(5) does not give the trustee any affirmative avoidance powers, his or her recovery under § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii) can not exceed the amount
of the insider preference established by § 547(b)(4)(B). See supra note 134 and accompanying text. To avoid the possibility of double liability being imposed upon the
secured party in connection with the trustee's recovery of the insider period improvement, the collateral deficiency as of the date of bankruptcy should be recomputed
following recovery of the $15,000 90-day improvement. Under this analysis, the
$15,000 security interest avoided under § 547(c)(5)(A)(i) would be subtracted from
the value of the collateral as of the bankruptcy-day measuring point before the insider
period computation is made under § 547(c)(5)(A)(ii). This would result in a $70,000
revised improvement in position between the one-year measuring point ($100,000
debt minus $10,000 security equals a $90,000 collateral deficiency) and the bankruptcy day measuring point ($100,000 debt minus $80,000 [i.e. $95,000 - $15,000]
security equals a $20,000 collateral deficiency). Cf. supra notes 107-112 and accompanying text. Notice that the hypothetical discussed in the text would not be affected by
the suggested recomputation.
138. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
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Intehtional Buildups

Because section 547(c)(5) enacts an arbitrary two-point
improvement in position test that ignores intervening fluctuations in the value of inventory and receivables collateral,
there is potential for abuse by overreaching secured parties.
Suppose, for example, that at the ninety-day measuring
point D owes SP $100,000 secured by accounts with a value
of $90,000. However, as D slides into insolvency accounts
are paid more quickly than they are replaced; as a result, 30
days before bankruptcy the value of the accounts securing
the $100,000 loan is only $25,000. 139 When SP learns of D's
predicament, it pressures D to rebuild the level of his accounts by foregoing payment of other debts and conducting
a crash sale of inventory or other assets at less than market
value. Finally, when D files a chapter 7 petition, he owes SP
$100,000 and the value of the accounts is, once again,
$90,000.140
Sound bankruptcy policy condemns the transaction described in the above hypothetical as a classic preference.
However, it appears that the Bankruptcy Reform Act leaves
the trustee powerless to take any action against it, because
the amount of SP's collateral deficiency has not been reduced under the section 547(c)(5) two-point calculation.
The collateral deficiency on each of the two calculation dates
was $10,000 ($100,000 debt minus $90,000 security), and the
intervening dip and intentional buildup in the size of the col-

lateral are irrelevant. 141

Clearly, this situation cries out for reform. Some com139. Typically, when a business begins to slip into insolvency, the level of its accounts deteriorates. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 216.

140. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 565. To further complicate the problem, the
preferred transferee might even be able to control the timing of the calculation of
improvement by filing an involuntary petition under § 303 of the New Act. 11 U.S.C.
§ 303 (Supp. IV 1980). See Clark, supra note 90, at 178-79. Admittedly, the hypothetical situation will only rarely, if ever, occur in the real world. See WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10, at 881 (1972).
141. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980). The trustee may be able to attack this
transaction under § 548 of the New Act as a transfer made by the debtor "with actual
intent to hinder, delay or defraud" creditors. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1980).
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mentators have suggested that section 547(c)(5) be amended
to limit its protection to inventory and receivables acquired
in the ordinary course of the debtor's business.142 Although
this suggestion has merit, it is a case of overkill and is certain
to undermine the simplicity and administrative efficiency
sought by the drafters of section 547(c)(5). No longer would
the section be concerned primarily with an objective determination of improvement in the secured position of floating
lienors; rather, it would focus chiefly on factual matters and
would require endless litigation concerning the nature of the
debtor's business and "the method, manner and terms of the
debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral." 14 3 Moreover,
because of the open-ended nature of an ordinary course of
business requirement, these endless factual determinations
could arise in every bankruptcy proceeding involving inventory and receivables collateral, and not merely in those
where secured party manipulation is alleged.
Such a costly solution to a problem which is likely to
occur in practice only rarely is unwarranted. A less complex, more direct approach is required. Denying protection
under section 547(c)(5) to transfers of inventory and receivables made in bad faith is a preferable response to the problem of secured party manipulation. Obviously, such a
solution would also result in litigation involving factual matters (i.e. the good faith of debtors and their secured
financers); however, its narrow focus should confine these
costly disputes to cases where secured party misconduct is
alleged. Although Congress should consider amending section 547(c)(5) along these lines, the courts, if presented with
an appropriate case, ought not to wait for legislation.'" SeSee Queenan, The Preference Provisionsof the Pending Bankruptcy Law, 82 COM. L.J.
465, 472 (1977).
142. See Note, supra note 42, at 255-57. Cf WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 10,
at 881-82 (1972); Hogan, supra note 26, at 571-73. An earlier draft of what became
§ 547(c)(5) extended its protection only to inventory and receivables acquired or arising "in the ordinary course of a debtor's business."

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CON-

FERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted in

HOUSE REPORT, supra

note 5, at 211 (proposed § 60a(4)(IV)). See also U.C.C. § 9-108 (1972).
143. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 571.
144. Support for imposing a good faith requirement on transfers of inventory and
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cured party
abuse of the protection accorded them by section
"547(c)(5)
is clearly
outside the scope of the policy of that section, and a judicially imposed requirement of good faith is
an appropriate response.
C. Evaluating the Compromise
Historically, preference law is rooted in the law of

fraudulent conveyances. 145 Under section 60(b) of the For-

mer Act, these origins of preference law were manifested in
the subjective requirement that the preferred creditor have
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at
the time of the transfer. 146 The Bankruptcy Reform Act has

shaped a policy that attempts to move beyond this historical
development by adopting an approach to the preference
problem that is both objective and purposive. 147 One example of this development in the law of preferences under the
Bankruptcy Reform Act is elimination in the typical case of
the requirement that the transferee have reasonable cause to
believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transfer. 148 Another example is section 547(c)(5) which, together
receivables protected by § 547(c)(5) is found in § 1-203 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which imposes an obligation of good faith on every contract and duty under
the Code. U.C.C. § 1-203 (1972). Although § 1-203 of the Code is not part of the
Bankruptcy Reform Act and therefore does not control bankruptcy questions, it supplies a useful analogy for a bankruptcy judge construing § 547(c)(5) in a case involving secured party misconduct. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 573.
145. See Jackson & Kronman, Voidable PreferencesandProtectionof the Expectation Interest, 60 MINN. L. REV. 971, 977 (1976).
146. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
147. Jackson & Kronman, supra note 145, at 979.
148. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4) (Supp. IV 1980). The "reasonable cause to believe" test is retained only with respect to preferential transfers made to insiders "between 90 days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition." Id
Elimination of this requirement in most cases is supportive of modem bankruptcy
preference policy, because to "argue that the creditor's state of mind is an important
element of a preference and that creditors should not be required to disgorge what
they took in supposed innocence is to ignore the strong bankruptcy policy of equality
among creditors." HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 178. See supra note 44.
However, certain critics of section 547 have argued unpersuasively that "the burden has been shifted too far and now unfairly discriminates against the good faith
creditor." S. REP. No. 446, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 24 (1982). In response, the proposed
Bankruptcy Improvements Act of 1982 contains language reinserting the fraud based, subjective "reasonable cause to believe" test as an essential element of all
avoidable preferences. S. 2000, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 11 (1982).
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with section 547(e)(3), adopts an objective improvement in

position solution to the problem of floating lien collateral attaching to pre-existing
security interests during the prefer49
ence period.

In formulating a preference policy concerning the floating lien, the drafters of the Bankruptcy Reform Act had two
primary purposes. First, they sought to respond to the criticism that case law under the Former Act weighed "the scales
much too heavily on the secured creditor's side."' 150 Their
second objective, which was no less important than the first,

was to devise a reasonably simple rule that would avoid
complicated and expensive litigation of factual issues on a
case by case basis.' 51 Careful analysis of the resulting legislative product, sections 547(e)(3) and 547(c)(5), indicates

that, for the most part, both of these goals have been
realized.
149.
150.

11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(5) (Supp. IV 1980).

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON
COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(1970), reprintedin HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 208. As discussed above, cases

decided under the preference rules of the Former Act afforded nearly absolute protection to the floating lien against the trustee's preference attack. See supra notes 20 to
39 and accompanying text. Taken together, §§ 547(e)(3) and 547(c)(5) overrule by
inconsistency all of the major theories recognized by the courts under the Former Act.
See HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 374. The "Mississippi River" and "so far perfected" theories clearly do not survive passage of § 547(e)(3), because that section
does not leave room for arguments that seek to relate the timing of a transfer back to
a date prior to the debtor's acquisition of rights in the collateral. See Kaye, supra
note 5, at 207-08; Nimmer, supra note 46, at 316-17. The few jurisdictions that appear
to have held that under § 9-108 security interests in after-acquired collateral are not
given for antecedent debt and therefore are not preferential ought to reconsider their
position, both because of its infirmity under the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution and its inconsistency with the spirit of § 547(e)(3) and § 547(c)(5). See
supra note 39 and accompanying text; Young, supra note 5, at 233. Finally,
§ 547(c)(5) is, in effect, a limited codification of the relaxed substitution theory, and
any attempt to apply that theory more broadly than allowed under § 547(c)(5) would
be contrary to the policy of such section. See Henson, supra note 10, at 18-19; Nimmer, supra note 46, at 319.
151. The policy. . . sacrifices a great deal to simplicity of administration. It
seeks to avoid complicated and expensive litigation by focusing the judicial
inquiry on the situation as it existed on the two dates chosen as measuring
points.
NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERICAL CODE (1970), reprinted in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 216.
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The foundation of sections 547(e)(3) and 547(c)(5) is the
principle that preference law should seek to protect the inter-

ests of unsecured creditors of the debtor without undermining the reasonable contractual expectations of floating lien
secured parties. 52 This requires a delicate balancing of state

policies recognizing the commercial significance of inventory
and receivables financing against federal bankruptcy policies

designed to provide unsecured creditors equitable access to

at least some of the assets of insolvent debtors. 5 3 The Bank-

ruptcy Reform Act accomplishes this task by building a
compromise solution around the following two premises:
1) that floating lien creditors reasonably expect to retain in
bankruptcy a secured status equal to that held at the begin-

ning of the preference period; and 2) that it is unreasonable
for such secured creditors to expect to benefit from any improvement in this position, to the prejudice of unsecured
creditors, during the ninety-day period preceding the
debtor's financial collapse. 54 The first assumption acknowledges the need to minimize conflict between bankruptcy
preference law and the provisions of the Uniform Commer-

cial Code recognizing the commercial significance of, and
giving effect to, extensions of credit secured by property to
152. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 145, at 976-77. It is just as essential that
valid contractual expectations be protected in bankruptcy as in other settings. In this
regard, Jackson and Kronman take the position that:
If a trustee in bankruptcy were permitted to use his avoiding powers to nullify, without restriction, the priorities for which the bankrupt's secured creditors have bargained, the use of secured transactions as a financing device
would be significantly chilled-perhaps frostbitten. Like contracts of other
sorts, secured contracts embody a set of expectations that cannot be ignored
without frustrating the very purpose such transactions are designed to serve.
Obviously this result would be undesirable from the standpoint of secured
creditors; but more importantly, it would also harm debtors by significantly
restricting the availability of credit.
Id at 988-89 (footnote omitted). However, a purposive analysis of § 547(c)(5) should
not fail to consider that the improvement in position test was intended to rescue unsecured creditors from the perceived unfairness of case law under the Former Act
giving near total protection against preference attack to the floating lien. See NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON COORDINATION
OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (1970), reprinted

in HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 208..
153. See supra notes 40-49 and accompanying text.
154. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 145, at 976.
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be acquired in the future. 15 5 The second assumption recog-

nizes the precarious position in bankruptcy of the class of
unsecured claimants, which is made to shoulder the greatest

burden of the debtor's financial collapse, and attempts to
minimize
the social costs of the bankruptcy process by makof the debtor's assets to
ing available at least a small portion
56
these least fortunate of creditors.

Of course, the actual expectations of floating lienors are
probably not in accord with those assumed immediately
above. Floating lien secured parties expect to receive what

they bargained for-all present and subsequently acquired
property of the debtor as described in the security agreement
between the parties.' 57 Moreover, they and their champions

reason that unsecured claimants, who chose to extend credit
without taking security and with notice of all filed financing
statements evidencing outstanding security interests, have no
equitable claim to avoid enforcement of58valid security agreements in accordance with their terms.1
155. See Kapela v. Newman, 649 F.2d 887, 890-91 (1st Cir. 1981).
156. Every bankruptcy contains within itself the seeds of others, of a chain of
failed enterprises radiating throughout the economy. To guard against this
danger, which threatens all classes of creditors-indeed, all participants in
the economy--the trustee is empowered to avoid the contractual rights of
the bankrupt's secured creditors in certain limited cases; by doing so, he can
increase that portion of the bankrupt's estate which will be applied to satisfy
the claims of general unsecured creditors.
Jackson & Kronman, supra note 145, at 989 (footnotes omitted).
157. See id at 977, 998-1000.
158. It is commonly said that "equality is equity" in bankruptcy. What is
"equality"? What is "equity"? The concept of equality seems almost Orwellian: all are equal, but some are more equal than others. Those who were
prudent enough to take security are reduced to the level of those who did
not, so that the ever-rising costs of administration tend to make distributions
to creditors approach zero. It would in fact, on the average, make almost no
difference to unsecured creditors if all secured transactions were set aside in
bankruptcy, but it would make a considerable difference to the secured parties involved. Is it "equity" to frustrate the legitimate agreements of the
parties to a secured transaction? It may seem equitable to unsecured creditors to do so, but they extended credit when they could easily have refused
or else taken security, and the financing statement evidencing a "prior"
claim to the debtor's assets was a matter of public record.
Henson, "Proceeds" Under the Uniform Commerical Code, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 232,
252-53 (1965) (footnotes omitted). Professor Viles, a champion of the unsecured creditor, has stated the counterpoint:
To whom is the [filed financing] statement sufficient? Inasmuch as the New
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However, in most cases the balance struck by section
547(c)(5) appears to be a fair and rational balancing of the
competing interests-floating lien creditors receive the full
benefit of their secured status as it existed ninety days before

bankruptcy, and unsecured creditors are not prejudiced as a
result of any gains made by floating lienors during the
debtor's slide into bankruptcy. Moreover, inventory and re-

ceivables creditors can insure total protection of their afteracquired collateral by inserting (and policing) provisions in
their loan documentation that require the loans to be adequately secured at all times.' 5 9
Assuming that questions of valuation do not prove to be
overly complicated and time consuming, 60 the New Act also

appears to have realized its second objective by enacting a
simple, utilitarian solution to the problem of the floating lien
in bankruptcy. Section 547(e)(3) provides a clear rule for
determining the timing of transfers of after-acquired collat-

eral,' 6' and, in the typical case, section 547(c)(5) limits the
focus of the judicial or administrative inquiry to two quescollateral deficiency at each
tions of fact-the amount of the
62
of the two measuring points.

However, it is difficult to devise a simple solution to a
broad-based problem, and some commentators have argued
that the two-point rule is capable of producing arbitrary and
unfair results in certain hypothetical situations.
Righteousness of the secured creditor rests heavily on the Code's system of
notice-filing, which purports to overcome the fraud of secret liens, this is an
especially pertinent question. Is it adequate warning to a potential bankrupt's employees, small-time suppliers, and casual vendors? Can any kind
of filed notice justify omitting them entirely or almost entirely from the
bankruptcy distribution? As total security becomes widespread the logical
alternatives to taking the risk will reduce to one alternative: ceasing altogether to be a small-time supplier, an employee, or a casual vendor. ...
The likeliest party to benefit under the Code notice requirements is the security-conscious financer who needs to know whether another financer has
already taken a (maximum) security interest in the property of a proposed
debtor.
Viles, The Commercial Code v. The Bankruptcy Act, 55 Ky. L.J. 636, 670-71 (1967)
(footnote omitted).
159. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 91; Clark, supra note 90, at 178.
161. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
162. See Hogan, supra note 26, at 564.
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One such problem area, intentional buildups of collateral occurring during the period between the two measuring
points, has already been discussed in this article. 163 A second source of concern among some of the analysts involves
application of section 547(c)(5) to cyclical businesses and
their inventory and receivables financers. These critics argue that industries which do not have a constant flow of accounts or inventory, such as toy manufacturers, suppliers of
recreational items and other seasonal businesses, may experience difficulty in obtaining secured credit, because the twopoint rule may operate to deny protection to secured creditors who rely
on seasonal increases in the value of their
64
1
collateral.
Although this criticism is valid in theory, it appears to
be an unavoidable by-product of the utilitarian goals of the
drafters of the New Act, who were willing to accept arbitrary
results in certain unusual cases in order to obtain the desired
165
simplicity of administration in the great majority of cases.
Moreover, it has not been demonstrated to be a serious practical problem. For example, it is unlikely that a seasonal
business will fail while at the top of a business cycle. 16 6 Furthermore, it may be possible for imaginative commercial
lawyers to draft around the problem in many cases, perhaps
by incorporating into security agreements additional policing requirements designed to insure that funds are not advanced against seasonal collateral unless and until they are
adequately secured. Seasonal collateral financers should
also consider the possibility of further securing their loans
163. See supra notes 139-144 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of1978. The Full-EmploymentFor-LawyersBill: Part IV: Avoiding Powers of the Trustee, 1980 UTAH L. REV. 19,

50; Hogan, supra note 26, at 564-65; Kronman, supra note 24, at 146-47. Thus, for
example, "the rule could penalize creditors of a business that has a cyclical flow of

inventory; if the low point happened to fall ninety days before bankruptcy, such creditors.could be hurt by the 'bright line' established in the rule." Clark, supra note 90,
at 179.
165.

See

NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY CONFERENCE, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE

ON COORDINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND

THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL

CODE (1970), reprintedin HOUSE REPORT, supra note 5, at 216.
166. See Morris, Bankruptcy Law Reform. Preferences, Secret Liens and Floating
Liens, 54 MINN. L. REV. 737, 766 (1970).
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with other types of property owned by the debtor, such as
business equipment or fixtures. Section 547(c)(5) works very
well in most cases most of the time, and amendment of the
provision to deal with the problem of seasonal collateral
should be considered only as a last recourse, and not before
it has been empirically demonstrated that there is a serious
problem in commercial reality.
IV. CONCLUSION
Case law under the Former Act provided nearly absolute protection to perfected security interests attaching to
collateral during the preference period pursuant to after-acquired property clauses in valid pre-existing security agreements. The Bankruptcy Reform Act replaced this case law
with a legislative compromise that first treats most, if not all,
security interests attaching to after-acquired collateral within
ninety days of bankruptcy as preferences, and then exempts
from preference attack security interests in inventory and receivables collateral to the extent that the floating lien
financer has not improved its secured position at the end of
the ninety-day period.
Although section 547(c)(5) is capable of complex applications, it is, in general, an efficient and workable response
to the perceived unfairness of the case law under the Former
Act. This article has discussed certain factual situations
which, when analyzed under section 547(c)(5), may produce
results not clearly in accord with fundamental notions of
bankruptcy preference policy. However, purposive construction of section 547(c)(5) by the courts and creative lawyering by counsel for floating lien financers could eliminate
most, if not all, of these difficulties. Finally, the article suggests that Congress consider amending section 547(c)(5) by
adding a good faith requirement designed to eliminate potential secured party abuse of the two-point improvement in
position test.

